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We demonstrate that secure quantum key distribution systems based on continuous variables imple-
mentations can operate beyond the apparent 3 dB loss limit that is implied by the beam splitting
attack [7]. The loss limit was established for standard minimum uncertainty states such as coherent
states. We show that by an appropriate postselection mechanism we can enter a region where Eve’s
knowledge on Alice’s key falls behind the information shared between Alice and Bob even in the
presence of substantial losses.
The distribution of random keys for cryptographic pur-
poses can be made secure by using the fundamental prop-
erties of quantum systems such that any interception of
the key information can be detected. This was first dis-
cussed for discrete systems [1] and experimental demon-
strations have been carried out using optical sources,
which produce low photon number states [2]. More re-
cently schemes based on continuous quantum variables
have been proposed [3–7], where the scheme by Gottes-
man and Preskill [4] has been proven to be information-
theoretically secure. Apart from being of fundamen-
tal interest these schemes offer certain practical advan-
tages. However, they all share one major disadvantage:
currently it is thought that the use of continuous vari-
able techniques does not allow quantum key distribution
(QKD) beyond 50 % loss [7]. This severely limits the
applicability of such schemes.
The argument leading to this limit is based on an
optimal cloning approach for optical signals that cor-
responds to a beam splitting attack on the signals [7].
At the loss limit an eavesdropper Eve can replace the
lossy channel by a perfect one with an adapted beam
splitter to mimic the losses. She can then generate a
cloned signal with a fidelity which depends on the beam
splitter transmission. In order to extract a secure key
out of the material with the usual privacy amplification
tools [8] and a free choice of the required error correc-
tion technique, including the efficient two-way schemes
[9], however, the mutual information IAB between Al-
ice and Bob has to exceed the information that either
of them shares with Eve: IAB > max{IAE , IEB}. This
condition arises as follows: In order to perform privacy
amplification [8] one needs to be able to estimate Eve’s
information on the data shared by Alice and Bob after
error correction. Two-way error correction provides ad-
ditional information to Eve in two forms: redundant in-
formation to enable error correction, that are according
to Shannon’s theorem at least 1− IAB bits, and informa-
tion about the positions of bits where Alice’s and Bob’s
data initially differ. In the worst case, the two-way error
correction scheme leaks the complete information about
these error positions to Eve, so that Eve’s information
about Alice’s and Bob’s key now stands on the same
footing and satisfies I ′(AB)E ≥ max{IAE , IEB}. In the
protocol presented below, we actually find equality, as ex-
plained later. Taking this into account, the usual mech-
anism of one-way communication schemes applies, and
we find for individual attacks via [8,10–12] the condition
IAB > max{IAE , IEB}.∗ Yet, for losses beyond 50%, one
finds that the condition IAB > IAE is violated so that
the above standard methods cannot be used without ad-
vanced quantum technologies such as quantum memories
and entanglement purification which are presently not
available. Note that one may to restrict the information
flow for error correction from Bob to Alice or vice versa.
In this case the ”maximum” in the above case may safely
replaced by the ”minimum” [10,13], but efficient proto-
cols for one way error correction close to the Shannon
limit for typical error rates around 5% are still missing
up to now.
In this paper we propose a novel scheme, which oper-
ates beyond the apparent 3 dB limit that is applied by
the beam splitting attack. In certain situations it is still
possible to create a secure key [8] although IAB < IAE
or even IAB < IBE . For classical correlations the proce-
dure is known as advantage distillation [11]; upon closer
investigation this turns out to be a form of postselection
and requires two-way classical communication. Gottes-
man and Lo [14] used this technique to increase the tol-
erance against errors in the single-photon BB84 protocol.
Postselection is a standard intrinsic procedure in conven-
tional QKD with weak pulses: if no photon is detected
by Bob, or when Alice and Bob did not measure in the
same basis, the corresponding time slot is ignored and
hence does not contribute to the raw data. Without this
∗Following discussions with P. Grangier, it should be pointed
out that specific two-way error correction techniques might
leak less information about error positions leading to less de-
manding conditions.
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postselection the condition IAB ≥ max{IAE , IEB} could
never be reached for any QKD protocol for losses be-
yond 3 dB, because then Eve has access to better signals
than Bob. However, postselection allows unconditionally
secure key exchange in presence of large losses, limited
basically only by the photo-detection process [15]. The
situation becomes more subtle for continuous variable
schemes, since then always a non-vacuum signal reaches
Bob and correlations appear between the data measured
by Bob and that of an potential eavesdroppers via Alice’s
state preparation. Thus the postselection has to be made
more conscious, and here we show how to do this. The
selection of favorable data for Alice and Bob has been
previously addressed in the context of implementing the
BB84 protocol with weak coherent pulses in the presence
of a strong phase reference pulse [16]. Our results demon-
strate that continuous variables and weak coherent pulse
schemes are closely linked in the basic principles.
We consider the following scheme, which is similar to
those proposed by Cerf et al. [6] and Grosshans et al. [7].
Alice sends an ensemble of coherent states to Bob with
a Gaussian distribution of complex amplitudes centered
on the vacuum. Bob measures either of two conjugate
quadratures, say for example the in- and out-of phase
quadratures X and Y , using homodyne detection. The
measurement results x are then given as eigenvalues of
quadrature operator xˆλ =
1
2 (aˆe
−iλ + aˆ†eiλ) with λ = 0,
or pi2 . Bob will effectively see a Gaussian distribution
of real amplitude coherent states when he looks at the
quadrature X and a Gaussian distribution of imaginary
amplitude coherent states when he looks at the quadra-
ture Y . Bob reveals which quadrature he measured in
each time interval and estimates whether Alice prepared
a coherent state with a positive or negative displacement
in the corresponding quadrature. Alice and Bob can now
interpret positive displacements as logical ”0” and nega-
tive ones as logical ”1”.
For our analysis of the security of this scheme we ex-
tend this protocol and specify the used states by addi-
tional steps. After Bob’s publication of his choice of the
quadrature, Alice will interpret the state she sent either
as a member of the set {| − α e−iθ〉, |α eiθ〉}, if Bob
detected the quadrature X , or {| − iα e−iθ〉, |iα eiθ〉}
(α ∈ R), if Bob measured the quadrature Y . She now
publishes the values of α and θ. In each case, from
Bob’s and Eve’s perspective, this narrows down the num-
ber of possible signals to two, for example |α eiθ〉 or
| − α e−iθ〉. Thus Alice and Bob can build up a secret
key as before when now the encoding reads more specif-
ically: |α eiθ〉 → ”0”, | − α e−iθ〉 → ”1” for amplitude
measurements and |iα eiθ〉 → ”0”, | − iα e−iθ〉 → ”1”
for phase measurements. Other choices of signal sets are
possible, for example sets with point symmetry, but the
choice above turns out to be favorable.
To investigate the secrecy of the key the distribution
of Bob’s data conditioned on the choice of Alice can be
accessed using classical communication. For this purpose
Alice and Bob open up complete signal descriptions and
measurement results for some randomly chosen transmis-
sion events. Thus the statistics of Bob’s detected results
should mirror Alice’s coherent state preparation with ex-
pected Gaussian distributions centered according to the
complex amplitude displacements.
Eve’s first strategy is thus passive intervention via the
beamsplitter attack [7]. Eve’s intervention is indistin-
guishable from loss. In the typical loss model Alice’s
state is transformed as
|α eiθ〉B|0〉E → |√η α eiθ〉B |
√
1− η α eiθ〉E (1)
for arbitrary α and θ, where η is the transmission effi-
ciency between Alice and Bob. Alice and Bob are none
the wiser but Eve ends up with all the lost signal. It
was shown [7], that provided the loss is less than 50% it
is still possible for Alice and Bob to distill a secure key
when faced with such an attack. We will now show that
in fact 50 % loss is not an ultimate limit for secure QKD.
We wish to find a way by which Alice and Bob can
postselect a subset of the data for which they have a
high mutual information, but for which Eve and Alice
do not. Alice and Bob can base their selection proce-
dure on the parameter α and θ characterizing the state
preparation and Bob’s measurement results x or y. The
overall mutual information of Alice and Bob can then be
subdivided into different effective information channels
characterized by the parameters (α, θ, x), such that
ItotAB =
∫
α,θ,x
dx dα dθ p(α, θ, x) · IAB(α, θ, x).
(2)
Similarly the overall information Alice shares with Eve
can be composed from all single events.
Note, that the separable nature of the state of Eq. (1)
ensures that there is no correlation between Bob’s and
Eve’s quantum uncertainties. Thus Eve’s mutual infor-
mation with Alice does not depend on Bob’s detected
outcome x. Furthermore, Eve shares with Bob always
less information than with Alice, IBE < IAE , and it is
sufficient to consider Alice and Eve’s information only.
Altogether, this allows us to evaluate the knowledge
of the different parties separately for all effective in-
formation channels and we can restrict our analysis to
find suitable parameters (α, θ, x) with IAB(α, θ, x) >
IAE(α, θ). Since the beam splitting attack and proto-
col itself are symmetrical in respect to the considered
conjugate quadratures, it is also sufficient to investigate
only the case of a quadrature measurement X by Bob.
To identify the good effective channels, we calculate
the mutual information shared by Alice and Eve. Al-
ice sends a priori pure states. However knowing noth-
ing about Alice’s state preparation Eve would have to
distinguish between two allowed mixed states character-
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ized by positive or negative displacements in the respec-
tive quadrature. So far no general expression for the ac-
cessible information is known for non-orthogonal mixed
states. For this reason we provide Eve with the addi-
tional information about α and θ. As a trade-off Eve
has to distinguish for each effective channel between two
non-orthogonal pure states, in the case of X quadrature
measurements between |α eiθ〉 and | − α e−iθ〉. In this
situation the maximum accessible information is known.
It is given as a function of the overlap f of the respective
two states [17] in the form
IAE(α, θ) =
=
1
2
(1 +
√
1− f2(α, θ)) log(1 +
√
1− f2(α, θ)) +
+
1
2
(1−
√
1− f2(α, θ)) log(1−
√
1− f2(α, θ)). (3)
For an effective channel with parameters α and θ the
overlap can be calculated as
f(α, θ) = 〈−α
√
1− ηe−iθ|α
√
1− ηeiθ〉 = e−2·(1−η)·E2 ,
where we defined as E = α cos(θ). The protocol ensures
that the overlap and thus the mutual information of Eve
depends only on the effective amplitude E = α cos(θ).
As we will see later, the parameters α and θ enter the
mutual information of Alice and Bob always in the same
combination. This allows us to consider in the following
the parameters (E, x) only.
At this point we note that the states between which
Eve has to distinguish and their a-priori probabilities
do not change if we give Eve the additional information
whether Alice’s and Bob’s decoded bit differs for a given
signal. This kind of information is leaked in two-way er-
ror correction (see above). It is for this reason that we can
assume equality in the bound I ′(AB)E ≥ max{IAE , IEB}
of Eve’s information I ′(AB)E on Alice’s and Bob’s key
given the knowledge of all error positions.
Next, we calculate the mutual information of Alice and
Bob. According to the protocol Bob performs quadrature
measurements and decodes the bit value as the sign of the
detected displacement. Depending on the signal states
|±α e±iθ〉, his outcomes x are distributed corresponding
to one of the probability distributions
P (x| | ± α e±iθ〉) = |〈x0| ± α e±iθ〉|2 =
√
2
pi
e−2(x∓
√
η E))2
(4)
with |x0〉 as the eigenstate of the quadrature operators
with λ = 0. This decoding leads to an error rate
pe =


P (x||−α e−iθ〉)
P (||α eiθ〉)+P (x||−α e−iθ〉) for x > 0
P (x||α e−iθ〉)
P (x||α eiθ〉)+P (x||−α e−iθ〉) for x < 0 (5)
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FIG. 1. Illustration of the error rate of Bob’s decoding
scheme, here for a loss of 50% and an effective amplitude
E = α cos(θ) = 1. Left: probability distributions of Bob for
prepared bits ”0” and ”1”; Right: probability that Alice has
encoded ”0” or ”1”, if Bob obtained a result x.
To illustrate Bob’s decoding we consider in Fig. 1 the
case of 50% loss and an effective amplitude of E = 1.
The left graph depicts the two possible distributions for
Bob’s results x corresponding to Alice’s states |α eiθ〉 and
| − α e−iθ〉. For the intersection point at x = 0, Bob’s
measurement delivers no information, but for all other
values of x, the distribution corresponding to Alice’s en-
coded bit value is more probable. In the right graphs we
plotted the probability that Alice has encoded a ”0” or
”1”, if Bob actually obtained the value x. With the ar-
ranged bit assignment the smaller value of these graphs
gives Bob’s error probability corresponding to Eq. (5).
Alice’s and Bob’s mutual information can now be cal-
culated separately for all effective information channels
with (x,E) by the Shannon formula.
IAB(x,E) = 1 + pe log2 pe + (1− pe) log2(1 − pe) . (6)
FIG. 2. Comparison of the mutual information between
Alice and Bob and the information they share with Eve
for different state preparations with effective amplitude
E = cos(α) and measured outcomes x of Bob. Positive ar-
eas, colored bright, indicate effective information channels
that contribute to secure key exchange since they satisfy
IAB(x,E) > IAE(x,E).
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We are now in a position to identify those effective in-
formation channels with IAB(x,E) > IAE(x,E), which
allow to extract a secret key. Fig. 2 displays the differ-
ences of the respective information plotted for the events
(E, x) again in the case of 50% loss. Positive valued ar-
eas, indicating region of possible secure key exchange, are
colored bright, negative ones in dark. Thus our investiga-
tion allows us to model an ideal postselection procedure,
where all events (x,E) with IAB > max{IAE , IEB} ac-
tually contribute to the key.
The comparison of Fig. 2 between the mutual infor-
mation of Alice and Bob and the information they share
with Eve dplays an insight, that was first recognized in
[16]. Alice and Bob can actually utilize statistical mea-
surement results with large x to increase their security,
but Eve, on the other hand, cannot improve her error rate
for Bob’s selected data. This is, because her state is un-
correlated to Bob’s results x. Furthermore there exist for
each transmission η an optimum effective displacements
E , such that the mutual information between Alice and
Bob is maximized.
We can evaluate the key rates Rk, that can be achieved
in the presented postselection process as
Rk = Rr ×
∫
S
dx dE p(x,E) · [IAB(x,E)− IAE(x,E)], (7)
where Rr is the raw data rate, and S denotes the subset
of selected effective channels. For the presented protocol
the probability p(x,E) that the effective channel is used
is composed of Gaussian distribution of the effective am-
plitude E and the distribution of x conditioned on E.
With a distribution width d for the effective amplitudes
we find
p(x,E) =
=
√
2
dpi
e−2·E
2/d 1
2
(P (x||α eiθ〉) + P (x|| − α e−iθ〉)) (8)
with P (x|| ± α eiθ〉) given in Eq. (4).
First numerical calculations, where we limited our in-
tegration over the data set within ±4, indicate that in
the presence of 50% loss and for an optimized parameter
of d = 2.1, bit rates up to Rk = Rr × 0.0667 are achiev-
able. For a loss rate of 75%, we have found a key rate
of Rk = Rr × 0.0073. These calculations show that the
high repetition rates of continuous variable technology,
which is expected to be in the GHz region, can actually
lead to secure key rates that are well above currently
implemented schemes.
We have shown that continuous variable QKD using
coherent states in the presence of losses above 50% can
still be implemented securely against an eavesdropper us-
ing an individual beam splitter attack. The postselection
process solely relies on classical data processing and thus
does not require sophisticated quantum resources other
than coherent states. An absolute proof of security would
require the analysis of a more general attack by Eve.
However, it is likely that the beam splitting attack is the
optimal attack even in this protocol utilizing postselec-
tion. The existence of optimum effective displacements
for the mutual information between Alice and Bob opens
the possibility construct more elaborated protocols with
modified probability distributions for Alice’s state prepa-
ration to achieve higher the bit rates. However, in all such
protocols one has to be cautious to ensure that the beam
splitting attack remains the best eavesdropping strategy.
Our result pushes continuous variable QKD closer to
practical applications. In addition we have also shown
that the type of postselection protocol considered here
can also be employed for schemes using squeezed light,
such as in [5]
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